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행정학 석사학위논문

# Changes in American Education Policy and the Department of Education: the ACF Approach

2014년 2월

서울대학교 행정대학원

행정학과 행정학전공

조희진

# Changes in American Education Policy and the Department of Education: the ACF Approach

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## 국 문 초 록

20세기 이후 미국 연방정부의 규모와 역할은 꾸준히 증가하고 있다. 이로 인해 본래 지방정부의 영역이라고 여겨졌던 교육정책 분야 역시 연방정부의 개입 증가도 점점 늘어나는 추세이다. 본 연구는 Sabatier의 정책옹호모형(Advocacy Coalition Framework)과 역사적 신제도주의 이론을 적용하여 미국 연방정부 교육 정책의 시계열적 변화를 살펴보고, 시대별 변동요인을 설명하는데 목적이 있다.

역사적 제도주의 이론을 적용하여 교육 정책의 변화를 살펴본 결과 설립기 (1970-1980), 위기 (1981-1988), 안정기 (1989-1995), 번영기 (2000-2010)와 같이 네 번의 결정적 분기점(critical juncture)이 존재함을 확인하였다. 정책옹호모형을 통하여 시기별 변동요인을 분석한 결과 다음과 같다.

교육부 설립의 논쟁이 뜨거웠던 1970-1980년의 기간은 오일 쇼크의 여파로 인하여 미국의 경제 상황이 악화되었고, 교육에 대한 국민들의 관심이 크지 않았다. 더불어 연방정부의 교육정책 개입과 관련하여 행정 각 부처와 교육청 공무원들, 이익집단, 의회의 거센 반발이 있었다. 하지만 카터대통령과 교사이익단체인 National Education Association의 강력한 의지와 지원으로 인하여 타협과 협상을 거쳐 우여곡절 끝에 1980년 연방 교육부가 설립 될 수 있었다.

1981년 보수 성향의 레이건 대통령이 집권하며 교육부는 위기를 맞는다. 레이건이 교육부 폐지 발표를 발표하며 교육부의 인원과 예산이 대폭 감소하였기 때문에 교육부는 살아남기 위하여 조직의 위상과 네트워크를 동원한다. 조직의 정당성을 알리기 위하여 내부적으로 대외협력 기능이 강화되었으며, 의회 및 각 부처 공무원들에게 로비 활동이 증가하였고, 교육부 장관이 발표한 A Nation at Risk 레포트는 미국 교육의 암담한 현실을 고발하여 언론과 대중들의 관심을 끌었다. 교육의 대한 국가적 관심이 증가하면서 레이건 및 보수연합은 결국 연방정부의 교육 기능 삭감을 멈추어야 했다.

1989년부터 1995년의 기간 동안 교육부는 안정화된다. 미국 경제가 회복되었고, A Nation at Risk 레포트로 인하여 연방정부의 교육정책 개입에 대한 여론이 호의적이었으며, 조지 H. 부시 대통령과 클린턴 대통령은 교육 문제에 대한 관심이 많았다. 여전히 보수주의자들과 교육가들은 연방정부의 지나친 개입을 반대하였지만 대통령의 강력한 의지와 대기업의 후원으로 인하여 교육부의 예산, 인력, 조직 기능이 안정화되었다.

1996년 이후 미국 교육부는 급격하게 팽창한다. 높아져만 가는 교육에 대한 국민들의 관심 때문에 연방정부 교육 개입을 반대하던 옹호연합이 분산되었다. 특히 공화당이 입장을 전환하여 개입을 찬성하는 옹호연합에 참여하였기 때문에 조지 W. 부시 대통령은 취임 직후 No Child Left Behind Act를 발표하고 어려움 없이 의회의 승인을 받을 수 있었다. NCLB는 연방정부의 교육예산을 250% 증가시켰고, 신설된 프로그램의 집행을 위하여 내부조직을 증가하였다.

이상의 결과를 토대로 본 연구의 정책적 시사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 행정기구는 영속성을 지닌다. 행정수반의 의견이나 정치적 결정이 조직의 행정자원의 감축시키거나 폐지하는 결정을 내릴지라도 조직은 위상과 네트워크를 동원하여 새로운 정책 의제를 설정한다.

둘째, 정책 의제 설정에 있어 대통령의 역할이 중요하다. 하지만 모든 대통령이 자신의 의견을 즉각 정책에 반영 할 수 있는 것은 아니다. 대통령이 속해 있는 정책옹호연합은 의제설정에서 우위를 선점하지만 반대옹호연합과의 타협과 절충이 이루어지지 않을 경우 정책이 실현되지 못한다.

셋째, 정책결정에 있어 가장 큰 영향력을 미치는 것은 의회이다. 의회는 미국의 다원주의적 성격을 가장 잘 나타내는 정치적 타협과 협상의 장이다. 대통령이나 정치인 등 소수의 정책 방향보다 오랜 시간 네트워크와 자원을 구축한 정책옹호연합이 의회 정책결정에 더 크고 지속적인 영향력을 미친다.

넷째, Sabatier의 가설과 달리 정책옹호연합은 시간의 흐름에 따

라 변화한다. 옹호연합의 참가자들은 연합의 지속보다 자신의 이익을 정책에 반영하려는 목표를 최우선에 두기 때문에 Sabatier의 가정과 달리 정책옹호연합모형은 오히려 3-5년 정도의 단기간 동안의 정책 분석에 유용할 수 있다.

주요어: 정책옹호모형, 미국 교육부, 역사적 신제도주의, 행정기구, 교육 정책, 연방정부

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# **Chapter I: Introduction**

## **1. Problem Statement and Research Objective**

From the beginning of its history, Americans built a nation with inherent distrust in government, considering it as a “necessary evil.” Thus, even when the Articles of Confederation had failed, the Founding Fathers envisioned a government that performs only the essential functions to prevent the leviathan’s abuse of power. In the Constitution, powers vested in the presidency are entailed in only three short clauses. Indeed, there is no mention of the state administration in the Constitution, nor is there a reference to civil service, budget, management, organization, and planning (Stillman, 1990).

However, American society is becoming much more complex and unpredictable. Having gone through the Civil War and Industrial Revolution, American people demanded proactive actions from federal government to correct social injustice. In response to such demands, American federal government transformed itself into a gigantic administrative state. Once a minimal, legislative state it was, the United States federal government now deeply interferes with citizens’ everyday lives from cradle to grave.

From new institutionalism perspective, a key instrument to expand federal authority is the state agency. Once established, administrative agencies continue to grow incrementally, with occasional exceptions to critical junctures that shift policy direction. It is commonsensical that

external events bring changes in administrative agencies; for example, the 9/11 terrorist attack created the Department of Homeland Security. However, the question of *the process how* is often missing. Creation and changes in administrative agencies are determined by public policies, which are influenced by societal context. Thus, it is important to study the policy process in order to better understand the role and scope of an administrative agency.

This paper provides an account on the historical context of policy punctuations in the field of education policy, which had been traditionally handled by the state and local governments. It aims to examine the evolution of an American federal education agency, the Department of education, with a focus on four critical junctures that shifted the department's policy direction. In doing so, the changes made in American society from 1970 to 2010 will be empirically analyzed. Then, the process of policy changes with an emphasis on the policy actors' beliefs, resources, and strategies, will be examined through the advocacy coalition framework.

## **2. Research Subject and Scope**

This is a qualitative case study on historical evolution of the U.S Department of Education (ED). Although it was created in 1980, in order to examine the policy process of its creation, time span of the research will cover from 1970 to 2010.

In chapter 2, based upon theoretical background and literature review, a conceptual framework designed for this research is presented,

In chapter 3, longitudinal analysis on empirical measurements of the ED administrative resources, including budget, personnel, and legislations, is provided. After checking the significant shifts in ED's history, the paper will identify four critical junctures.

In chapter 4, advocacy coalition framework is adopted to compare and contrast the societal contexts and policy process of the four critical junctures. The first juncture occurred in 1970 to 1980 when the discussion for the creation of the Department of Education was active; the second juncture appeared immediately after its creation until 1988; the third juncture covers 1989 to 1995; and the fourth juncture focuses on the events after 1995.

In chapter 5, it provides the research summary, limitation, and implication for future studies.

### **3. Research Methodology**

In order to take clash and coalition of interest groups, government officials, and politicians into consideration, the advocacy coalition framework with few modifications is applied. Also, comparative case study methodology is used to analyze similarities and differences in historical context of the four critical junctures.

Specifically, the primary research methodology is reviewing the literature on federal education policy. Government published documents,

Congressional hearings report, autobiographies of the policy participants, research papers, newspaper articles, and the texts of legislations were examined. In order to acquire data on social indicators, websites for the U.S Census Bureau and Policy Agendas Project were accessed the most. Policy Agendas Project is a research center in University of Texas at Austin's Department of Government, which collect and process data on public policy.

## **Chapter II: Theoretical Background**

### **1. Theoretical Background**

#### **(1) New Institutionalism**

New institutionalism was developed during the late 1970s to counteract atomistic explanation of behavioralism. Also, in contrast to the old institutionalism that depicts institution as a locus for human behavior, new institutionalism provides a framework for the interactions between institutions and human behavior (Ferris and Tang, 1993; Jung, 1999).

New institutionalism emphasizes the role of institution to explain the causal relationship between social phenomenon and human behavior. Institutions such as rules, norms, and other frameworks are construed as a product of human interaction within the encompassing environment. Human beings comply with the given institutions, but they may change the institutions when their cognitive conception of the surrounding environment changes. Thus, in order to maximize its goal in the changing environment, the institution is required to build legitimacy.

There are several sub-fields in new institutionalism depending on the main focus it takes, but this paper takes a particular connection with historical new institutionalism. Historical new institutionalism takes a holism approach because it believes that whole is more than just the sum of individual. It takes a close examination on intermediate-level institutional

factors such as organization behavior or economic interest groups and party competition; it aims to find out how the intermediate-level institutions connect individual actors and the state or society. Moreover, it often conducts longitudinal studies to examine historical causality.

From this point of view, history is not just what happened in the past, but it is what has affected the present situation. Therefore, understanding historical context is essential to grasp the social effect. Only with the right timing and circumstances, an institution may be created or changed (Jung, 2005: 737-741). Once established, the institutions tend to be “path-dependent,” meaning that they would not change unless critical junctures like a war, depression, or crisis happens. As a result, the critical junctures demand the institutions to adapt itself to a new environment abruptly and intermittently (Collier and Collier, 1991); after the crisis is over, the institutions stay in the same way until the next critical juncture comes. S. Krasner calls it a punctuated equilibrium (Krasner, 1984; 223-246). If they fail to adjust themselves to the new rules of the game, institutions would be put on a verge of extinction.

Consequently, historical new institutionalism studies the contexts of individual behavior through the institutions. Historically evolving institutions restrict individual’s behavior and interactions, but at the same time, choices and behavior of individuals and groups reshape the institution. Also, it accentuates importance of socio-economic development, ideas, power distribution, class structure, group dynamics, and other variables. (Jung, 2005: 740).



## **(2) Administrative Agencies**

Studies in administrative agencies have proliferated in the field of public administration. However, many studies that take a viewpoint from financial management, organization behavior, and human resource management focus on micro-level bureaucratic practices with an eye to increase administrative efficiency and organizational democracy. A handful of studies have examine macro-level questions, relating the administrative agencies to the state characteristics and functions, but their discussions are too abstract and theoretical (Jung, 2001). In this aspect, new institutionalism helps bridge the micro and macro level discussions on administrative agencies; as a meso-level theory, it provides how administrative agencies, as institutions, affect individual choices and vice-versa.

From public policy perspective, studying administrative agencies is important because it deepens our understanding of the public policy. The type of institutional structure determines the policy process, outcome, and even the social effect of the policies; and the policy again shapes the administrative agency. Therefore, studying how the cyclical relationship of the two influences human behavior would offer lots of implications.

### **1) Definition**

Weber defines administrative agency as an institutionalized ruling organization (Weber, 1965). According to the institutional approach, the state is composed of the sets of government institutions and agencies (Jung, 2001). State agencies are defined as “the set of institutions and

organizations through which state power is exercised” and “state functions realized” (Clark & Dear 1984: 45, 49). Thus, adopting the above-mentioned definition, administrative agency can be defined as "a set of institutions and organizations which delivers national policy to exercise the state authority."

The United States Constitution provides a legal basis for the administrative agencies in Article I, section 8. It states that "the Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The administrative agencies include executive agencies, independent agencies, commissions, and boards. Enabling statutes are required for creation. Quasi-administrative agencies that vicariously carry out the functions of administrative agencies are also included.

As of 2011, the administrative agencies in the United States composed 98.6% of federal government employment; even when military personnel are excluded, employees hired by federal administrative agencies made up 97.7%, whereas the judicial and legislative branch made up only 2.3% combined. Size of the administrative agencies can turn into a threat to civil society since the state would acquire more autonomy in planning and implementing national policy.

## 2) Administrative resources

Changes in administrative agencies are stimulated by internal or external demands. Internal organizational demands yield changes in

communication methods, organization culture, and other management issues. However, external push factors lead to the changes in administrative resources that adjust the agency's size and influence. Although each administrative agency is structured differently to best carry out its designated goal, they all operate through the common administrative resources: organization, budget, personnel, and legislation.

The type of an organization, whether it is titled to a bureau, office, or department, determines the symbolic importance of the policy. Also, the number of sub-division organizations implies level of specialization. Second, budget can be used as an indicator to measure the number of programs an agency supervises and the relative importance of the policies it implements. Third, the size of the administrative agency's employees hints whether the type of its policy is distributive, regulatory, redistributive, or constituent. Fourth, legislations provide legal basis for the agency's activities.

### **(3) Policy Change**

The term 'policy change' is widely used in various settings, but there is no consensus on the scope of definition. Still, there exist two streams of literatures regarding policy change. The first perspective sees policy change as a part of policy process. Since a policy goes thorough four policy stages (decision, implementation, evaluation, and feedback), this view presents that policy change occurs at the end of policy process through policy innovation, maintenance, succession, and termination (Hogwood & Peters, 1983: 26-29). The second perspective supposes any modification

from the original policy content and intended implementation method as a policy change. Whichever perspective is taken, most of the government policies are created as a result of policy change. There hardly is any policy created independently from scratch.

#### 1) Incrementalism and policy punctuation

There are theoretical attempts to describe the pattern for policy change. One takes an incremental approach to insist that government policies, especially the budget appropriation in Congress, are decided upon the previous year's decision due to the individuals' bounded rationality (Lindbloom, 1959). Realizing the limitations imposed by rule of the game, policy-decision participants base their decisions on political compromises among the bureaucrats, politicians, and interest groups (Wildavsky, 1964). Thus, the policy pattern tends to be incremental, fragmented, and sequential.

However, the incremental approach lacks its explanatory power to describe changes in policy direction. Although policy decisions are usually made incrementally, there are intense moments of rapid shift. Therefore, a group of scholars focus on policy punctuations. Because of bounded human rationality, policy makers focus only on the top priorities. When they face abrupt and intermittent external changes in the top policy priorities, the decision-makers quickly turn the policy direction to adjust to a crisis. Even after the crisis is over, their incremental decision-making tendency does not allow going back to the status before the crisis, thus sustaining the punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).

Then, what kinds of external events cause policy punctuation? Changes in policy environment and composition of policy interaction groups (Hogwood & Peters, 1983) were corroborated to be significant factors to determine policy changes. More abstract concepts such as conservatism, participation, practicality, diversity, and global leadership also have strong impact on policy changes.

#### **(4) Advocacy Coalition Framework**

One of the theoretical models to explain the policy process is conceived by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith in 1988. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) demonstrates causal paths to long-term policy changes. The ACF illustrates how policy actors with fundamentally different beliefs eventually overcome conflicts through a policy broker and policy learning. After its initial introduction, the ACF has been applied to many policy fields, especially those involving regulation and environmental issues for they have sharply divided policy advocacy coalitions.

To apply the ACF, the following premises should be met. First, a time period of 10 years or more is required for the analysis to understand policy change. Second, policy subsystems are the primary unit of analysis. Third, the members in each policy subsystems share beliefs that direct policies and programs. (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118–120).

The ACF has advantages in identifying political characteristics of the policy participants within the policy subsystem; it shows a progress of

long-term political conflicts; also, it is useful to understand dynamical relationship between policy environment and process.

### 1) Advocacy coalition


Advocacy coalition is composed of two groups of actors who are associated with a specific policy problem. They include not only the traditional iron triangles' members but also "officials from all levels of government, consultants, scientists, and members of the media (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 118)."The actors look for other groups who share identical or similar beliefs to form a strong coalition.

### 2) Belief system

Beliefs lie at the core of advocacy coalition to be formed and maintained; they what the coalitions contest for. Policy advocacy coalitions mobilize available resources to inculcate their beliefs into government policy or program (Jung, 2008: 117). A belief system is comprised of three levels. At the top of the hierarchy rest *deep core beliefs*, the broadest and the most normative beliefs which have little direct relevancy on policy. An example might be one's belief in individual freedom over social welfare. Deep core beliefs are resistant to the changes as they are instilled as one's behavioral doctrine. The mid-level beliefs are *policy core beliefs* which determine the advocacy coalitions' ideal to management and coordination. They affect people's perception in policy goal, priorities, and instruments. Although they are also difficult to be changed, new experience and information might modify them. The bottom level is *secondary beliefs* that

are the most likely to change over time. They concern instrumental aspects of the policy, such as how to distribute budget, evaluate performance, and etc.

<Figure 1> Advocacy Coalition Framework



Source: Sabatier & Weible (2007)

### 3) Societal Context

A policy change in the ACF is stimulated by new opportunities or restrictions imposed on policy participants. Both relatively stable parameters and external events affect the policy participants to change their existing

beliefs. Relatively stable parameters include basic attitudes of the problem, distribution of natural resources, socio-cultural values and social structure, basic constitutional structure, all of which are slow to change. On the other hand, external events, such as changes in socioeconomic conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in systematic governing coalition, and policy decision and impacts from other subsystems, cause sudden changes in policy dynamics.

#### 4) Policy subsystem

The actual changes in policy are made within the specific policy subsystem. Advocacy coalitions and policy broker participate in a policy subsystem. Since the ACF illustrates policy changes ranging over 10 years, the advocacy coalitions in the policy subsystem had been contesting for at least 10 years. To have a successful policy change, one of the coalitions should modify its position. Policy broker can meddle to mediate conflicts; however, in reality, since policy broker also has political view, it is hard to find an impartial policy broker. Thus, for a successful policy change, one side's belief should be changed. Since the deep core beliefs are hard to be changed, usually the changes in secondary beliefs result in a policy change. The change in beliefs occurs through external shocks, policy-oriented learning, or hurting stalemate. External shocks stimulate the policy actors to renew their perception of the problem. Policy-oriented learning takes place when new scientific information is imbued, and hurting stalemate refers to the state that both sides are exhausted with no other alternative than changing their beliefs to finish the fight.



## **2. Literature Review**

### **(1) Literatures on the administrative agency changes from new institutionalism approach**

Many studies introduced new institutionalism to examine the changes in administrative agencies. Hook (1999) inspected evolution of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) during the New Deal era from the state-centered perspective. His account on the USDA contradicts with a commonly held view that the society-centered factors attributed to its expansion and decline. However, the bureaucratic politics and their links to government authorities, he argues, were driving force to the changes in USDA.

Pedriana and Stryker (2004) analyzed how the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was able to perform its duty without appropriate resources and tools. They highlight the weak and unorganized administrative agency's strategy to expand its capacity through the legal foundation. From 1965 to 1971, EEOC too powerless to execute Title VII funds, but it aggressively enforced laws to carry out its agenda.

A study by Kim (2005) examined how a change in public policy direction affected administrative agency. In a longitudinal study on U.S administrative agencies, he investigated the effect of the New Public Management (NPM) reform. Dividing the agencies by state function, he found out the NPM reform did not yield the expected changes. The size of federal employment, budget, and organization was not much reduced; even

when they were downsized, it lasted only temporarily and soon regressed back to the normalcy. Moreover, welfare function did not show decrease as expected.

In the East Asian countries, where the national policy had been directed largely by government authorities without the involvement from civil society, the pattern of changes in public policy and administrative agencies are consistent. In exploring the changes in Chinese administrative agencies from 1949 to 2003, Kim (2007) confirmed that government policy initiative to modernize China triggered the changes in Chinese administrative agencies to carry out the state's economic planning strategies. Similar is the case of Korea (Jung, 2004; Bae & Um, 2011). Studies confirmed that the changes in Korea's administrative agencies before the 1987 democratization were strongly driven by the state's economic development plans. The most resources were concentrated in agencies that carry out provision functions.

## **(2) Literature on the factors to policy change**

### **1) Changes in environment**

A body of literature stresses the importance of economic factors. Examining sizes of the U.S state government budget, Fabricant (1952) determined that per capita GDP, population density, and level of urbanization are the most important policy decision factors. Brazer (1959) also supported the finding; his study confirmed population density, family

income, and assistance from other levels of government as determinant factors for policy decision. Wilensky (1975) reached a conclusion that economic factors are translated into public policy more than political and demographic factors. Indeed, a study by Dawson and Robinson (1963) adds that the political variables turn into spurious variables once the socio-economic variables are removed.

On the other hand, political scientists heighten the importance of political variables. Median-voter theorem is often employed to describe how party competitions stimulate increase in welfare policy; the parties make commitment to increasing social services to gain more votes. Studying the changes in budget of the 48 U.S state governments from 1950 to 1980, Dye (1984) asserts that Democratic Party control in gubernatorial office and state Congress increases welfare spending. Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1969) used correlation analysis to determine significant variables to welfare policy; even when the socio-economic variables were controlled, political variables were still in effect.

Kettle (1997) reasoned that global pressure motivates government policy to be changed. Starting from the late 1970s, management reform to produce more goods and services for lower taxes swiped the world. The U.S, inspired by the global trend, adopted the New Public Management principle, but its implementation was not successful because of the split focuses.

## 2) Participants

The role of politicians, President, bureaucrats, and interest groups is validated in the studies on administrative agencies' policy changes in. March and Olson (1983) criticizes politicians that their thirst for fast, visible, and immediate accomplishments results in policy failure. Especially the government reorganization efforts end up with no better result, not improving intended administration costs, efficiency, or control, because the politicians are driven by short-sighted rewards.

Olson, D (1981) suggests that President, as a chief executive, exercises his authority to make changes in order to advance his leadership. From the President's viewpoint, fickle and irresponsible Congress hinders policy-making and implementation process, so the he himself attempts to direct the policy process through the executive agencies. This view endorses that executive agencies are submissive to the President; they are merely implementation tools with little discretion.

Durant (2008) highlighted bureaucratic politics in policy process regarding government reorganization. Bureaucrats participate in the reorganization politics to "weaponize" it. When the "weaponization" is successful, the agency may use it to win policy battles with other agencies.

Interest groups are another important factor to policy changes. Studies that adopted outside-initiative model (Cobb et al. 1976) and multiple streams model (Kingdon, 1984) have a particular focus on the role of interest groups in policy agenda setting. For example, Young (2010) emphasized the role of parents, teachers, and business groups to put reading education on state government's policy agenda.

### **(3) Literature on advocacy coalition framework**

A number of studies applied the ACF to investigate the effects of social context changes on policy changes in controversial policy areas. Environment policy is one of the frequently examined policy areas. Munro (1933) adopted the model to explain California's water resource policy from 1966 to 1984. In the study, he explained that belief systems of the protectionists and the developmentalists were affected by external factors such as California's economic downturn, severe drought, changes in governing body, and the increase in energy cost in the 1970s and 1980s. Weible (2006) used the model to approach beliefs of the stakeholders in California Marine protected area policy. Freudenburg and Gramling (2002) applied the ACF to federal offshore oil program policy so as to explain the changes brought by a new administration. This study provides an account that policy-oriented learning happens when there is a specialized forum.

The model extends its applicability outside of the environmental issue. Barke (1993: 129-145) explains the U.S federal communication policy. He emphasizes the importance of specialized forums and open policy discussion on policy-oriented learning. Sato (1999) supplemented the ACF with policy process analysis model (PAA) to investigate Japanese tobacco regulation policy. The application of PAA was useful to explain the process of how advocacy coalitions are formed. Brown and Stewart (1993) took a case in airline regulation policy in the U.S and found out that high inflation rate, political appointment, and policy-oriented learning through the specialized forums support the policy change.

The model has been applied in education policy as well. Mawhinney (1993) found how tightly-knitted policy communities influenced Ontario's French minority education policy through the ACF. Mazzoni (1993) investigated the advocacy coalitions are actively engaged in education reform movement to establish the first charter school in Minnesota. He evaluates that the ACF "appears to fit significant development within Minnesota's education policy system (Mazzoni, 1993: 377)." Feir (1995) provided similar account on Pennsylvania's education reform.

Nonetheless, some of the studies that applied the ACF to education policy confess that the model's premise is simply unlikely. Fusarelli (2003) adopted the ACF to examine the clash of interest groups in Texas on vouchers. His findings indicated that the varying level of commitment within the advocacy coalition makes its long-term union difficult. He adds that unlike in theory, a coalition is composed of groups with diverse interests, so it is hard to form a coalition that can resist fierce opposition from the other side. More studies side with Fusarelli's view. For instance, studying Milwaukee's voucher policy, Bulman and Kirp (1999) pointed out several internal conflicts within the pro-voucher coalition between market-oriented conservatives and equity-oriented minorities. In Michigan, religious groups and market-oriented groups fought over the preferred type of school choice (Morken & Formicola, 1999).

#### **(4) Summary**


A review on the existing body of literature helped to broaden understanding of the relationship between policy and administrative agencies, societal factors that contribute to policy change, and applicability of the advocacy coalition framework to reality. However, there is a missing link among those three bodies of literatures. Therefore, there is a need to bridge the gap among societal variables, policy change, and administrative agency.

### **3. Conceptual Framework**

In order to apply the advocacy coalition framework, there must be contesting coalitions with different belief systems. In regards to the issue of enlarging federal involvement in education, there exists a policy subsystem with two different belief systems. Second, there have been ample societal changes to affect the coalitions' belief systems. Third, since the time frame of the study covers from 1970 to 2010, it meets the time span requirement of the ACF, which is more than 10 years.

However, some components of the ACF are simplified to increase the model's applicability. In reality, allocation of natural resources is hard to be measured, and the role of a policy broker is often unrecognizable.

<Figure 2> Conceptual Framework





## **Chapter III: Changes in the Department of Education**

### **1. History of the Federal Education Agency**

The origin of federal involvement in education traces back to 1867 when President Andrew Jackson ordered creation of the Department of Education. However, the department lasted just for a year because people at the time considered that education must be put into the hands of local government. There was no compulsory education system in the United States, except for free elementary school education at urban centers. Only small percentage of population received education beyond elementary level. Thus, there was not much opposition to degrading its department status to an office inside the Department of Interior. Inside the Department of Interior, the Office of Education's primary responsibility was to collect education statistics. In 1890, the Second Morrill Act added the Office's responsibility to support administration of the land-grant higher education institutions, and the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act augmented federal role in vocational education.

<Figure 3> Status of the Education Agency

Department of Education		
1867-1868		

Department of Interior		
Office of Education 1868-1869	Bureau of Education 1869-1930	Office of Education 1930-1939

Federal Security Agency	
Office of Education 1939-1953	

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare	
Office of Education 1953-1972	Education Division 1972-1979

Department of Education	
1980-Present	

At the end of the World War, President Truman announced his plan to "strengthen the arm of the Federal Government for better integration of services in the fields of health, education, and welfare." His successor Eisenhower was able to create cabinet-level department, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), to realize it. The Office of Education received more federal support under the HEW. Shocked by the

Soviet launch of Sputnik, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958 to promote academic competence in the nation, especially in math, science, and foreign language education. By associating education with national defense and competence, the U.S government called for the first comprehensive federal involvement in education to win the armless battle with the Soviet Union

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Civil Rights movement was at its zenith. National mood for equal rights and equal opportunities brought about dramatic expansion of the HEW. As LBJ's Great Society highlighted the role of education for equal access, Congress passed a series of education legislations. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Title IX in the Education Amendments of 1972, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are the examples of the legislations that have been reauthorized even until now. Indeed, the most significant changes were brought by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). This significant piece of legislation authorized comprehensive federal education programs in poor urban and rural classrooms. The Higher Education Act of 1965 launched financial aid programs, thus enlarging federal involvement in higher education as well.

Due to the continuing expansion of federal involvement in education, the Department of Education was created in 1980. Today, ED engages in educational concern at every level. About 56 million students in attending roughly 99,000 public schools in nearly 14,000 school districts plus 34,000 private schools receive ED's support. Department also assist

more than 150 million students' higher education through grant, loan, and work-study programs (Department of Education, 2013).


## **2. Changes in Administrative Resources in the Department of Education**

### **(1) Organization**

The organizations at ED evolved throughout time. Although the changes were slowly made, they reflect ED's changing emphasis. <Figure 4> shows the number of offices at ED by function; offices for public relations and law compliances coordinate with state and local governments, other federal agencies, and public to build the department's legitimacy; offices for internal management and coordination refers to the organizations that deal with ED's internal affairs; policy and research offices include individual policy program offices, research institutions, and the White House policy initiatives.

The number of policy and research offices stayed around seven for almost two decades, until it jumped to 17 in 2006. The public relations and law compliance offices steadily decreased over time as ED accumulated legitimacy. Internal management function increased at first to institutionalize the overall department functions, and it decreased in the 1990s. However, as policy and research functions almost tripped in the 2000s, the management function also increased to monitor the programs.

<Figure4> Number of Offices by function




Source: U.S Government Manual

## (2) Budget

<Figure 5> illustrates the budget pattern for the Department of Education. A year after its inception, ED faced a sharp budget cut. Its budget, which started from \$40,000 million dollars (inflation adjusted in 2010 dollar) hit a low of roughly \$31,000 million dollars in 1983 and 1987. Throughout the 1990s, budget of ED stayed at around \$40,000 million dollars with an interesting low point in 1994. However, ED's budget trend faced dramatic changes in the 2000s. Since the sudden budget increase in 2000, it continued to grow until it reached its highest level of \$100,989 in 2006. After 2006, the budget dropped for three consequent years, and it was boosted up again in 2010.

<Figure 5> Budget of the Department of Education

(in millions of dollars, 2010 constant dollars)




Source: Office of Management and Budget

When the budget of ED is compared to other agencies', another pattern is found. Budget for the Education Division had steadily increased in the 1970s with its peak around 1980 when the Department of Education was established. However, soon after the establishment, ED faced a sharp decrease in federal budget share. The percentage budget share started to increase in the late 1980s and the pattern continued throughout the 1990s with an exception of a temporary budget cut in 1994. It was in 2000 that budget for ED suddenly escalated, reaching its highest percentage share of the federal budget in 2006. However, it was soon followed by a historical low of 2% in 2008. Although the federal share to ED seems to be small, in fact its discretionary budget is the third largest, only after the Department of

Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services (Department of Education 2013).


<Figure 6> Percentage of Federal Budget Allocated to  
Education Agency



Source: Office of Management and Budget.

ED is not the only agency that handles federal education programs. In fact, it takes only about 40% to 50% educational programs. The rest is distributed among the Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Defense, and more. It is interesting that ED's share increased in the 1980s when its budget faced a severe cut. ED's budget share in education decreased throughout the 1990s. Since 2000, ED takes up almost 50% of the education budget.

<Figure 7> Percentage Share of Education Budget in Federal Government




Source: National Center for Education Statistics

When examining the ED's budget by function, budget for the elementary and secondary schools has always increased, especially after 1996. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which has been augmented as it was reauthorized in Congress, provided a cause. Accelerated budget increase in special education and technical education since 1996 also affected the trend. For higher education, the budget showed an increasing pattern until 1994 when there was an abrupt drop; it was soon recovered in the subsequent year, but the pattern changed to budget decrease until 2001. ED spent the biggest amount of money on higher education from 2002 to 2006; its budget share exceeded 50 million dollars. The skyrocketed budget soon dropped quickly as well, that in 2009 it recorded negative amount due to the increase in uncollected student loans and interests.



Budget under “others” category includes Rehabilitation Services and Disability Research and Adult Education, which did not go through significant changes.

<Figure 8> Budget by educational level




Source: U.S Census Bureau

### (3) Employment

Even though ED’s budget and responsibilities have increased, employment at ED has not. It has the smallest number of staffs among 15 cabinet-level departments. It started with 7364 employees, but the number of employees continues to decrease; in 1988, there were only 4542 employees working for ED. Although there had been slight increases and decreases, the overall pattern indicates that the number of employees at ED is decreasing. This indicates that the nature of the tasks that ED carries out is not labor-intensive. About 99 percent of its budget is spent on

education assistance to states, school districts, postsecondary institutions, and students (Department of Education, 2013).

<Figure 9> Employment at the Department of Education




Source: Federal Employment Reports

When employment pattern at ED is compared to other agencies', another perspective can be gained. While the absolute number of employees suggests steady decrease in workforce, there was an increase in ED's employment throughout the 1990s. This result might be contributed to the overall federal government size reduction in the 1990s. Since the number of employees at ED had stayed so small, it was not much affected by the federal efforts to trim its employees. Nevertheless, employment started to drop since 2000 with a sign of possible recovery in 2010.

Another reason for the employees at ED can stress the "shadow workforce." Light (1999) argued that when New Public Management

principle was introduced, federal government pretended to reduce the size of employment through contract out.

<Figure 10> Percentage of employees at ED to executive



Source: Office of Management and Budget.


#### (4) Legislation

<Figure 11> illustrates the number of public laws on education from 1970 to 2009. There were a total of 342 laws. It is interesting that the pattern for legislation is opposite to the pattern for budget and personnel. The most number of legislations passed during the mid-1980s and 1990s when budget and personnel for ED recorded low, and the number decreased in the 2000s just as ED's budget rapidly hiked up.

Detailed breakdown of the legislation is shown in <Figure 12>. Legislation on higher education composed 41% of the public laws while


Elementary and Secondary education legislation composed 12%. The number of legislation is closely related to interest group lobbying; since individual higher education institutions work as interest groups, they had better access to Congress.

<Figure 11> Number of established public law on education



Source: Policy Agenda Projects

<Figure 12> Public law on education by subtopic



Source: Policy Agenda Projects

### **3. Summary**

Based upon the empirical data presented above, it is confirmed that the major changes for ED's administrative resources occurred in four distinct time periods. This pattern validates new institutionalism's emphasis on critical juncture and punctuated equilibrium; due to the path-dependent nature of institutions, institutions make only minor modifications to the existing practice until an external event demands a sudden change. For the analysis, the time span from 1970 to 2010 will be divided into the following four time phases: the first phase from 1970 to 1980, the second from 1981 to 1988, the third from 1988 to 1995, and the fourth from 1996 to 2010.

During the first time phase, the primary federal agency on education was the Division of Education under HEW. Its budget kept growing both in absolute terms and in comparison to the total executive branch. Nonetheless, its share for the total federal education budget decreased due to the increasing programs at the U.S Department of Agriculture. The number of legislation on education also showed slight increase from 40 to 45.

Right after its establishment, ED faced immediate decrease in budget and personnel, and such pattern lasted for about a decade. During the second time phase, budget in both absolute number and percentage to executive branch dropped, but ED's upgraded status provided more budget share in a total federal education budget. Employment also decreased. The only actual increase in ED's administrative resources was the number of public laws in education, showing Congress' active support on education.

Internally, organizations for management, public relations and law compliances increased to establish its foundation.

The third time phase stabilized the department. Budget and personnel exhibited incremental increases. There was a temporary decrease in 1994-95, but it was soon recovered in the following year. Public laws, on the other hands, decreased. The number of organizations also decreased as the department was internally arranged.

The last time phase, from 1996 to 2010, is denoted by ED's expansion. Both personnel and budget dramatically increased after 2000. Internal organizations that support policy programs also increased; consequently, internal management and coordination functions increased to support monitoring. After 2006, there was a sudden drop, but it would require more years to examine whether the pattern is temporary or continual. Interestingly, only few public laws on education were established during this time period. It once again illustrated the reciprocal relationship between budget and public law.

## **Chapter IV: Changes in Federal Education Policy**

In chapter III, four time phases with distinct policy directions were identified based on the changes in ED's administrative resources. The efforts of policy actors during the first time phase (from 1970 to 1980) were culminated in creation of the Department of Education; the second phase (from 1981 to 1988) witnessed ongoing struggles for ED's survival due to the Ragan Revolution; the ED's administrative resources were stabilized during the third phase (1989-1995); and there was a dramatic growth of ED during the fourth time phase (from 1996 to 2010). In this section, policy process for the four policy punctuations and the events leading to them will be examined through the ACF.

### **1. Societal Context**

#### **(1) Relatively Stable Parameters**

##### **1) Basic attributes of the problem**

According to the ACF, basic attributes of the problems belong to the relatively stable parameters that are slow to change. The question of the ED's role and scope is directly related to how much federal government should be allowed. Pro-federal involvement coalition reasoned that federal involvement not only improves academic performance of the students but also better coordinates with other related social service agencies. On the

other hand, anti-federal involvement coalition argued that enlarging federal government role is dangerous to state autonomy. Also, it is doubtful whether federal involvement would be effective in increasing academic performance of the nation.

## 2) Constitutional Structure

The U.S Constitution is ambiguous on the scope of federal government. While the principal of federalism is surely granted, some of the texts can be interpreted arbitrarily. Two of the most controversial texts are the Tenth Amendment and the elastic clause.

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” It guarantees that education must be handled by the state governments since there was no mention of it in the Constitution.

However, the “necessary and proper clause,” or the elastic clause, provides foundation for the Executive branch to create new agencies as necessary. “The Congress shall have Power ... to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

Thus, based upon one’s interpretation, he or she may argue the legitimacy of ED from both sides.



### 3) Socio-cultural values and social structure


American public shares the assumption that education is very important for the nation. Thomas Jefferson said to James Madison that “above all things I hope the education of the common people will be attended to; convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.” From very early time in American history, education was viewed as a tool to uphold the nation’s liberty and democracy. Although the delivery methods, either by the federal government or state government, are being controversial, there is a general consensus that school’s function should be more than teaching academic subjects.

## **(2) External events**

### 1) Socio-economic changes

Economic fluctuation affected the changes in policy and administrative agencies. Changes in inflation rate and unemployment rate are shown in <Figure 13>. Due to the Oil Shock in 1973 and 1979, economy during the phase one and the first part of the phase two were unstable. Especially during the early 1980s, unemployment rate hiked up, causing people’s dissatisfaction. Economy was not favorable throughout the second phase, but it recovered during the third and fourth time phases until the 2008 financial crisis hit the nation.


<Figure 13> Inflation and Unemployment Rate



Source: U.S Census Bureau

Economy might well affect the government spending level. <Figure 14> demonstrates the pattern for government spending as in percentage of national GDP. While the state and local spending show relatively stable increasing pattern, federal government spending fluctuates as time went on. During the phase one, federal government spending increased; during the second and third phase it decreased; during the fourth phase, government spending slightly increased then jumped up due to the 2008 financial crisis.


<Figure 14> Government Spending in Percentage of National GDP



Source: U.S Census Bureau

Another important socio-economic factor in education is education attainment level. <Figure 15> confirms that high school graduation rate has stayed at the same level while college enrollment rate has been increasing from the third phase, and high school dropout rate has decreased over the years.

<Figure 15> High School Graduation and College Enrollment Rate for 14 to 24 Years Olds




Source: U.S Census Bureau

## 2) Changes in public opinion

Gallup survey result shows the percentage of respondents who identified education as the most important issue in America. During the phase one and two, only about 0.01 percent of the respondents answered education was the most important national issue. During the phase three, increasing attention was given to education. The beginning of phase four received the highest level of attention, although it soon died out.

<Figure 16> Gallup Survey on the Most Important Problem in America:  
Percentage Share of Education




Source: Policy Agendas Project

However, data for policy mood in education is not consistent with the survey result about the most important national issue. The concept of policy mood was conceived by James A. Stimson to investigate public's preference over government policy from the liberal-conservative continuum. Thus, it exhibits more partisan characters on the issue. Public's sentiment on education during the phase one decreased, and it was raised favorably

during the second phase. Third phase enjoyed high level of education policy mood. During the fourth phase, policy mood for education policy stayed at relatively high level, but the pattern shows obvious decrease over time. Thus, the changes in the issue saliency must have affected national policies in education.

<Figure 17> Policy Mood for Education Policy



Source: Policy Agendas Project

### 3) Changes in systematic governing condition

From 1970 to 2010, there were 11 presidential elections and 20 mid-term elections. For the most part of the phase one, Democratic Congress worked with Republican Presidents except when Democrat President Carter reigned from 1977 to 1981. During the second phase, Republican Presidents occupied the White House. On the other hand, Democrats were still strong

in Congress except for the short-lived Republican majority in Senate for the 97<sup>th</sup>, 98<sup>th</sup>, and 99<sup>th</sup> Congress.

Divided government continued for the phase three, as G.H. Bush had Democrat Congress. Clinton started his term with undivided government, but when Republicans gained majority seats in both Senate and House in the 1994 mid-term election, he still had six more years in office. During the fourth phase, Clinton worked with Republican Congress, and his successor President Bush enjoyed the first undivided government after Carter as both White House and the Capitol Hill were occupied by the Republican Party for the first six years of his term. For his last two years, Democrats ruled both House and Senate, and his successor President Obama could enjoy the undivided government as his term started.


<Table 18> Party Control in Congress and the Presidency

Years	Congress	Senate	House of Representatives	President
1969–1971	91st	Democrat	Democrat	Richard Nixon ( R )
1971–1973	92nd	Democrat	Democrat	
1973–1975	93rd	Democrat	Democrat	Gerald Ford ( R )
1975–1977	94th	Democrat	Democrat	
1977–1979	95th	Democrat	Democrat	Jimmy Carter ( D )
1979–1981	96th	Democrat	Democrat	
1981–1983	97th	Republican	Democrat	Ronald Reagan ( R )
1983–1985	98th	Republican	Democrat	
1985–1987	99th	Republican	Democrat	
1987–1989	100th	Democrat	Democrat	

1989–1991	101st	Democrat	Democrat	George H. W. Bush ( R )
1991–1993	102nd	Democrat	Democrat	
1993–1995	103rd	Democrat	Democrat	Bill Clinton ( D )
1995–1997	104th	Republican	Republican	
1997–1999	105th	Republican	Republican	
1999–2001	106th	Republican	Republican	
2001–2003	107th	Rep/Dem	Republican	George W. Bush ( R )
2003–2005	108th	Republican	Republican	
2005–2007	109th	Republican	Republican	
2007–2009	110th	Democrat	Democrat	
2009–2011	111th	Democrat	Democrat	Barack Obama (D)

Individual President’s interest in education is an important factor in ED’s policy change as he is a chief of the Executive branch. Through the inspection of each President’s State of Union address, each President’s attention level on education can be implied. During the phase one, only Carter showed fervent zeal for education by mentioning it 55 times in four years. During the phase two, Presidential interest in education was relatively low. However, during the third phase, the first self-claimed “education President,” George H. Bush, showed his interest in education by mentioning it 48 times. Presidential attention in education exploded in phase four during Clinton administration as he mentioned it 174 times only in his second term. The attention level decreased as George W. Bush showed little attention during his first term. He showed more attention during the second term, and President Obama mentioned education in his speech for 54 times in his first State of Union Address in 2010.

<Figure 19> Mention of Education in the State of Union Address




Source: Policy Agenda Projects

To inspect congressional hearings on education, it increased during the phase one, recorded the highest and decreased during the phase two, slightly increased and then decreased during the phase three, and kept declining throughout the phase four.

When the number of hearings is compared to the number of public law during the same time period, it is found that the highest success rate of the education bill's success was during the second phase; during 1985 to 1989, 32% of bills that went through congressional hearings became public law. On the other hand, the years 1995-1999 recorded the lowest passage rate of 9%.




<Figure 20> Number of Congressional Hearings on Education



Source: Policy Agenda Projects

<Figure 21> illustrated how much more Congress appropriated budget to the Department of Education than President requested. In general, Congress reduces the size of budget that President requests. However, during the phase one, Congress appropriated more budget; in 1982, Congress increased the President's budget by 38.8%. This shows that Congress and the President had clearly divided idea on education. During the phase two, Congress generally cut the budget request by the Presidents; G.H. Bush faced about 8-10% budget cut while it fluctuated more during the Clinton administration. G.W. Bush's education budget was cut less than his precedents, and in 2006, Congress appropriated 55% more budget. For the first budget request that President Obama submitted, Congress cut 39.8% of the requested.

<Figure 21> Percentage of Appropriated Budget over President's Budget Request



Source: Department of Education

## **2. Policy Subsystem**

### **(1) “Though Thy Beginning Was Small”: Creation of the Department of Education (1970-1980)**

The first critical juncture in the history of ED is its creation in 1980. This section examines the policy subsystem that led to its creation.

#### **1) Advocacy coalition for increasing federal involvement**

##### **A. President**

The advocacy coalition for the creation of ED was formed as National Education Association (NEA) endorsed Jimmy Carter in the 1976 Presidential election. Jimmy Carter, a former classroom teacher, had a profound personal interest in education. While he was serving a governor of Georgia, he invested heavily in education. Thus, he had the most interest and experience in education than any other presidential candidate in 1976. Moreover, Carter was a responsible man who kept his words. After getting elected, he was determined to carry out his campaign promise to NEA.

##### **B. NEA and interest groups**

NEA, which made its first presidential endorsement to Carter, was a burgeoning education interest group after it excluded school administrators to become a purely teacher labor organization. In order to improve the teacher's working conditions, it strongly needed federal government support

in education. With NEA at frontier, other interest groups joined. The Chief State School Officers, the National PTA, the National School Boards Association, the Secondary School Principals, the Council for Exceptional Children, the American Education Research Association, and many other education interest groups supported the creation on basis of enhancing education's national "status" and "symbol."

#### C. Politicians, media, and citizen groups

In Congress, Senator Abraham Ribicoff proposed a bill to establish the Department of Education, and other Democrat congressmen in Education and Labor Committee supported it. Media's attention to the bill's progress in Congress also favored ED. Citizen groups, such as Citizens Citizen Committee for a Cabinet Department of Education, also participated in the movement.

#### D. Academia

Scholars also sided with the pro-federal involvement coalition. Scholars in education argued that it was important to establish the education department as a symbol of national concern. Scholars in public administration and political science presented a managerial aspect; since HEW was too large to be effectively managed, there was a need to break it down.

## 2) Advocacy coalition against increasing federal involvement

### A. Bureaucrats

The most organized opposition came from within government. The secretary of HEW, Joseph Califano, opposed separation his department. Career staffs in Education Division didn't like the move as well because it threatened their established positions. Other departments were afraid that the creation of ED would downsize their share in education programs. For example, Department of Agriculture feared that its free lunch programs would be taken away.

### B. Executive Office

Even Carter's political assistants, staffs at the Office of Management and Budget, and members of the President's Reorganization Project persuaded Carter to abandon ED. They were doubtful if it could be passed in Congress, thus hurting the President's reputation (Heffernan, 2001).

### C. American Federation of Teachers and interest groups

American Federation of Teachers (AFT), a rivalry interest group to NEA was worried that the newly created education department would be capture by NEA. Catholic Schools, higher education groups, Children's Defense Fund, African-American groups, and native American groups sided with AFT because the discussion on ED was focusing mainly on elementary and secondary education in public schools. Other education interest groups

that had developed networks with bureaucrats in HEW were unenthusiastic with a new department as well.

### 3) Beliefs

Both groups shared deep core beliefs on the issue that education is important. However, the policy core beliefs on the issue were different. The pro-federal involvement coalition considered that federal involvement is necessary to enhance national education because state and local government were not only apathetic but also incompetent in the matters of education; it preferred providing categorical grants to the states on the basis of their needs to improve education. Also, there were arguments for better communication and management through the Department of Education to reduce government waste.

On the contrary, anti-federal involvement coalition argued that education would be best handled by state and local governments; it argued that increasing federal government regulations and monitoring were already deteriorating American education. Thus, it favored block grants to increase state discretion. Also, it believed that education programs would be better coordinated within HEW because other social problems are closely related to education.

### 4) Strategies and resources

NEA was the most influential and devoted group to created ED. NEA recommended Walter Mondale as a Carter's vice president running mate because Mondale's brother held a chief executive position at NEA. After getting Carter elected to the presidency, NEA strongly pushed the agenda even when international affairs and economic hardships distracted Carter from the issue. In addition to the intermittent letter blitzes, it mobilized the teachers who had free time during summer to follow congressional campaigns to influence the undecided legislators. Its headquarter in Washington D.C put all the available resources to lobby Capitol Hill. Bert Lance, a head of OMB and even Carter held occasional meetings with NEA to discuss their strategy. An account told by the chairman of Government Affairs Committee provides how fervent the NEA efforts were; he complained that "your teachers are crawling all over us (Heffernan, 2001)." As NEA received condemnations for its omnipresence in policy process, it changed the strategy to manipulate the process from behind. It congregated with other interest groups and organized activities to inform public the importance of ED. Furthermore, the President's personal appeal enforced Congress to pass the bill. Although Carter was not so popular and well-respected in Congress, congressmen could not ignore President's desperate plea.

Strategy of the opposition coalition was less enthusiastic. Since its position was to protect their interest than to promote, its actions were reactive and never proactive. Interest groups lacked a direct connection to government since Secretary Califano and OMB head Bert Lance eventually complied with Carter's aspiration. When the opinions for establishment of

ED were dominating, this coalition's strategy was to minimize the scope of ED.

#### 5) Policy decision

Thanks to NEA and Carter, the Department of Education was coming. However, it took two years of battle in Congress to decide the role and scope of the department. While Carter wanted ED to embrace all federal education programs, the opposition coalition simply wanted to change the name of Education Division to Department of Education.

After a series of hearings on sensitive issues such as child nutrition program, vocational rehabilitation program, Head Start, and science education, Senate passed the bill in 1978 after deleting many programs. However, the bill was lapsed in the House due to the interest group pressure.

To ensure the passage of the bill, pro-federal coalition narrowed down the scope of ED even more. Moreover, its emphasis was not anymore "visibility;" its emphasis was shifted to better liaison with other levels of government and reduction in costs. Task force to lobby legislators was formed, and it assured that there will be limitations on bureaucratic growth at ED. One of the most important change happened in 1979 was that four new members were added to the House Government Operations Committee. NEA was quick to establish contacts with them. As a result, the Department of Education Organization Act was passed on October 1979 by a slight margin of 215 to 201 votes in the House.



## 6) Policy impact

As a result of the legislation, the Department of Education was created in 1980. Since a lot of programs were cut in Congress, its start was humble. They had few employees with inadequate resources; even chairs and desks were unavailable for a while. The first secretary, Shirley Hufstedler, was so busy to appoint management position that she was not able to handle other policy-related matters. However, the biggest threat ED faced was the imminent change in leadership. With an upcoming election, no one could guarantee how enthusiastic the succeeding President and secretary would be.

### **(2) To Be or Not To Be: the Reagan Revolution (1981-1988)**

The second critical juncture is marked with Department of Education's struggle to survive. It faced challenges just a year after its inception as Republican candidate Ronald Reagan was elected to a presidency. This section explores how the policy subsystem decided the fate of ED.

#### 1) Advocacy coalition against increasing federal involvement

##### A. President Reagan

The most obvious transition from the first phase is the new President. As a conservative Republican, Reagan's campaign made no secret in his commitment to abolish ED. He believed that ED deteriorated the state rights and efficiency of the federal government. Reagan's focus in education were school prayers, tuition tax return, and private schools; bilingual education, sex education, progressive teaching methods, and the NEA were nothing but hated agenda.

#### B. Conservatives

Education by this time turned into an ideological issue. Conservative politicians and citizens insisted Congress to "abolish this giant octopus thrust upon the nation against its wishes (U.S News and World Report, 1981: 33)."The chief National Institute of Education (NIE) was successful in abolishing his organization.

### 2) Advocacy coalition for increasing federal involvement

#### A. Department of Education

Morale of ED career employees was depreciating everyday as the President announced his plan to abolish their workplace. To retain their career, staffs actively built connections with Congressmen, bureaucrats in other social services departments, and media. The secretary position, which many had turned down, was given to Terrel Bell. In one interview, Bell confessed that he packed his belongings for only one year in Washington as his mission was to be unemployed in a year. Although Bell's stance on ED

is vague, as a head of the department, Bell certainly left one of the greatest remarks in American education, thus preserving ED.

#### B. Interest groups

Education interest groups that fought over the creation of ED were on the same boat once ED was created. On top of the obvious NEA support, AFT, Catholic schools associations, and minority group interest groups now coalesced to preserve the new department. Their quick shift in position shows that the beliefs of interest groups which opposed ED's creation just one year earlier were secondary level. They were resistant to any new changes, whether it is creation or abolition, because they would need to build relationship with the new insiders.

#### C. Congress

Congress as whole was resistant to the change. The fierce three-year-long battle over ED's creation ended just one year ago, and they were not interested in fighting over the same issue in a near future. Moreover, since the initial creation limited the role and scope of ED, the department was constantly struggling. Since ED's role and influence were so meager, Congress doubted how it could threat American education. Over the years of fight, Congress' interest in education was increased, as the increased number of hearings indicates. Even among Reagan's most loyal supporters, a group 21 freshman Republicans in Congress formed the Coalition against Reductions in Education (CARE) to resist the President's will.

### 3) Beliefs

The beliefs of each side is identical with those in phase one. The matter was mainly fought over federal control versus state rights.

### 4) Strategies and resources

Strategies of the anti-federal coalition were political. President was leading this coalition, so it had plenty of resources. Believing in a small government, Reagan cut budget for all non-defense departments. Budget cut for ED was more severe as Reagan forced Congress to pass the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 (ECIA). The ECIA significantly reduced funding for elementary and secondary schools. As economy got worse, Reagan and conservatives were determined that unnecessary government spending, especially in social services programs, should be cut to recover government deficits. Also, Reagan cut many categorical grants and transformed them into block grants; it was not “revenue sharing” but “granting authority.” So-called Reagan devolution sought to empower the states. Probably the main reason for opposition coalition’s eventual failure is due to the President’s declining attention to the issue since the White House was preoccupied with economy,

Lacking the necessary resources, anti-federal involvement coalition used their influence. Congress intentionally delayed the bill to abolish ED. The time was favorable as well. Public was so concerned about worsening economy that education was not perceived to be a national priority to

discuss. The coalition of interest groups provided powerful resources to the congressmen who supported ED. Therefore, Congress often inflated President's budget request for ED. They together supported the ED's plan and strategies.

Department of Education sought its way to survival. It lacked financial resources, organization, and staff members to carry out the agenda. However, its report, *A Nation at Risk* saved the department from the risk. Secretary Terrel Bell asked Reagan to form a task force to investigate American education. Since Reagan procrastinated, Bell made one under himself. Bell's commission on the report harshly criticized the mediocrity of American education and demanded a reform. Its bold beginning states: "If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. [...] we have allowed this to happen to ourselves."

The report's findings about worsening academic performance at secondary schools were shocking to American public. It is interesting that the White House enjoyed the report. Looking at the research findings, the White House Office thought that this report would persuade public that federal role in education was in no effect. However, American public reacted in an exactly opposite direction. Public demand for federal role in education was amplified, and even Reagan could not defy it at this point.

## 5) Policy decision and impacts

Reagan and conservatives lost the battle, and ED survived. Overall federal social service spending during the Reagan era did not decrease because the bureaucrats in those departments found a way to twist the situation in favor of them. Interest groups and Congress helped them so as to acquire more influence and votes for re-election. Although administrative resources at ED decreased at first, the trend stopped around 1985 when Reagan gave up on abolishing it. Economy, public opinion, and Democratic Congress contributed to saving ED at risk. Reagan failed to abolish the department, but he could at least suppress its expansion during his term. If a pro-federal involvement president were elected in 1980, ED could have been captured by interest groups like NEA that hoped to exploit federal resources. Reagan detached the interest group influence from ED, thus leaving his successor George H. Bush more autonomy in education policies.

### **(3) The Politics of Education: Stabilization of ED (1988-1995)**

The issue in the third time phase is no longer whether there should be federal involvement in education. The question turned into *how much* it should be allowed. Since Reagan politicized the issue of education, policy subsystem during the Bush and Clinton years show strong partisanship. Moreover, *A Nation at Risk* established the importance of outcome in education. While the previous education reform highlighted ameliorating input, such as teacher-student ratio, school facilities, and teaching

methodologies, education reform after *A Nation at Risk* reinforced on academic goal, evaluation, and accountability. Improving economic conditions and intensifying public attention in education resulted in the changes in policy direction even with the divided control in Congress and presidency.

#### 1) Advocacy coalition for increasing federal involvement

Since bureaucrats at ED always side with the federal involvement, their participation is a default condition.

##### A. President G.H. Bush and Clinton

President Bush presented himself as a “tender and gentle” Republican. Witnessing that Reagan’s popularity was hurt by his harsh stance on social services, Bush supported social welfare programs that most Republicans were skeptical of. Indeed, he is the first self-claimed “education President.” His perception of the American education aligned with *A Nation at Risk*; and he emphasized the need for proficiency testing.

His successor, President Clinton continued the legacies of Bush’s education reform. He re-labeled Bush’s failed education reform and succeeded implementing it. As indicated by the number of mentioning education in his State of Union Address, Clinton firmly believed that improving economy and ripen public attention would allow him to reform federal social services including health care and education. Thus, this time

phase received strong presidential support to institute the outcome-oriented education reform.

#### B. Democrats

Since Reagan politicized education, Congressmen were clearly divided on the issue of education by their partisanship. Just 10 years ago when ED was created, the issue of federal involvement in education was supported or refuted regardless of one's political stance; some Democrats disapproved it, while some Republicans underscored the need for ED to erect values in American education. Democrats, who favored increasing government social services and categorical grants, supported increasing federal responsibility in upgrading American education.

#### C. Business Coalition for Education Reform

A new group joined the pro-federal government coalition. As education reform through testing and innovation was taking the mood, business leaders paid special attention to education. For example, Kent Nelson at United Postal Service, John Hall of Ashland oil, Lou Gerstner of IBM, Frank Shrantz of Boeing, Ed Rust of State Farm Insurance encouraged governors to keep up the reform (Cross, 2004: 99). Some business leaders invested in education with genuine motivation, but others saw the school reform as an opportunity to increase profit. School reform facilitated more technology; new textbooks, new computers, new projectors and many other new instructional resources were needed. Thus, business leaders took a part in pro-federal coalition to maximize their profit.



## 2) Advocacy coalition against federal involvement

### A. Educators

Education reform movement faced the biggest opposition from educators across the country. Teachers were against the idea that their performance be measure and evaluated. School administrators also felt burdened to be responsible for student academic performance.

Apart from the opinions of state politicians, most state department of education opposed to federal education reform movement. Although it was guaranteed that there would be no national standardized tests, it cost much time and state resources to develop their own standards and measurement tools. Moreover, the new regulations would surely increase more red tapes for compliance, so state government officials were against it.

### B. Republicans

As Democrats joined the pro-federal coalition, Republicans joined the anti-federal coalition. Even though President George H. Bush was a Republican, they turned down the president to advance their party stance.

### C. Interest groups

Educational interest groups, except for AFT which endorsed technical support to develop goals and standards of academic excellence for standardized reform, joined the opposition coalition. Even NEA, which had long belonged to the pro-federal involvement coalition, shifted its side. Interest groups felt a need to increase federal involvement for the benefits of

their members (mostly teachers), but not as much to overturn routines at their workplace.

### 3) Beliefs

Since the question moved from state autonomy vs. federal control to educator's autonomy vs. federal standards, the belief system for the issue was shifted. While the deep core beliefs stayed still the same, pro-federal involvement coalition changed its secondary beliefs. Academic goals and measurement emerged as important policy tools. This belief coincided with the New Public Management in that both emphasized performance and evaluation.

On the other hand, anti-federal involvement coalition, most of whose members were teachers, had a deep-rooted distrust in the standard testing. Educators believed that the quality of education cannot be measured through the standard testing. They hated that their curriculum should be modified to prepare students for a test instead of more meaningful lessons. They pointed out that the standard testing did more harm than good since some teachers manipulated the student answer sheets, prevented the students who were obviously going to fail the test from taking it, and some even announced answers in class. This coalition could not see how the standardized test could be implemented in real educational field. Also, politicians on this side still retained the belief that block grants with less federal involvement were the best policy tools.

#### 4) Strategies and resources

Having Presidents in the coalition meant having more resources. President George H. Bush summoned governors in Charlottesville, VA to a national education summit. He recognized the need to collaborate with governors to promote the national education reform. Bill Clinton, a governor of Arkansas, was an active member of the education summit. Later at another education meeting, Bush invited Clinton as a guest speaker. Thus, both Bush and Clinton utilized the networks with governors to advance their agenda. In addition to the National Governors Association, the Council of Chief State School Officers joined the coalition.

Also, although it lost interest groups' support, business corporations provided even more financial resources, personnel, and information for implementation.

For the anti-federal involvement coalition, educators convinced parents and local communities that the education reform aimed to allow federal government stepping into classrooms. However, parents did not buy their arguments since they wanted to know the performance of local schools on national scale. Widespread networks of the educators petitioned and persuaded their Congressmen, but absence of a strong frontier group made its agenda unheard in Washington.

Although the opposition coalition was in disadvantage to win the standard-based education reform battle, it brought another issue on the table: a school choice. Ignited by the best-selling book *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools* by John E. Chubb and Terry Moe, the rights of students

and parents to choose which school they wish to attend were nationally promoted.

#### 5) Policy decision

It is ironic that Republican President George H. Bush's reform bill *America 2000* failed in Democrat-controlled Congress that expanded its role through the Interstate Commerce Clause. However, America 2000's core proposals were inherited in Clinton's *Goals 2000 Educate American Act* in 1994. The bill reflected the modifications made by Republicans, but the Democrat controlled Congress passed the standard-based reform with a sizeable margin of 63 to 22 votes in Senate, and 306 to 121 votes in the House (Anderson, 2007).

In 1995, Congress was controlled by Republicans for the first time since 1950s. Republican Party made a "Contract with America," promising that it would downsize federal government to increase efficiency. As the number of hearings during the time indicates, the Republican Congress attempted a number of bills to cut education spending. However, their efforts were futile because of harsh opposition from their constituents. Moreover, Business Coalition for Education Reform that included business organizations like the Business Roundtable, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, National Alliance for Business, Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and National Association of Manufacturers advocated enlarging federal role (New York State Archive, 2009). In addition, it could not override Clinton's veto.

#### 6) Policy impact

After the Goals 2000 reform, the argument is no longer about federal interference with state; it is federal about entrenchment in classroom. Influence of new public management was imprinted in education. Federal fund was granted only when the federal regulations were met. States' "voluntary" development of standards was required, and school districts had to innovate to survive. School choice, vouchers, teacher performance pay, and charter schools trace back to this time period.

### **(4) Increasing Agency Autonomy (1996 to 2010)**

The advocacy coalitions from the previous time were upheld, except for a major shift from each side.

#### 1) Advocacy coalition for increasing federal involvement

##### A. Republicans

The 1996 Presidential nominee for the Republican Party was Robert Dole. Serving as a Congressman for more than 30 years, he was a deft politician. He knew how politics work. Witnessing the progress of federal enlargement, dissatisfied Dole promised America that he would cut government size by reducing social services, including education. Education was one of the determinant issues in the 1996 election, and Dole stated that ED was a stumbling block to American education; he made a commitment

to abolish it. This strategy was ineffective because the middle-class suburban parents so-called “soccer moms” did not find his platform attractive. Public attention to education reform was so high that it only hurt to roll back federal involvement in education.

As Clinton was re-elected, the defeated GOP realized what Americans want. It swiftly changed its policy stance and joined the pro-federal involvement coalition.

## 2) Advocacy coalition against increasing federal involvement

### A. Governors and local officials

Governors revolted. Governors were long friends of the pro-federal involvement coalition, but the level of federal involvement at this time was more than what they expected. As mandatory annual national testing was being discussed, governors opposed it fiercely, saying that the nationalized testing was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the local education officials and school district employees who were already exhausted by the paper works to meet increased federal regulations hated adding even more burdens with further increase of the federal role. They criticized the No Child Left Behind Act as “No Child Left Untested Act.”

## 3) Beliefs

Now that Republicans joined the pro-federal involvement coalition, there was even more emphasis on standardized tests and accountability.

Accountability is the concept that came along with Republicans to enforce responsibilities of students, school districts, and educators for the results.

While the pro-federal coalition's beliefs were readjusted to focus on standard-based testing and accountability, the opposition side's belief to the state autonomy was heightened. The fewer members it got in the coalition, the stronger its attachment to the belief.

#### 4) Resources and strategy

Enjoying favorable public interest and economic situation, President Clinton attempted to expand federal money on education during his second term. He tried to add more money for the Elementary and Secondary School Act's 1999 reauthorization. However, he could not concentrate on convincing the opposition coalition since most of his time and resources were devoted to deal with the Lewinski scandal. Thus, even when majority of the Republicans realigned their policy stance, Clinton could not get advantage of them.

When George W. Bush was running for the 2000 election, he chose education as the most important national issue. His experience as a governor of Texas gave a lesson that centralized government action is needed to fix American education. Therefore, when elected, his task force developed a blueprint for the American education policy even before his inauguration. On his third day in the office, President Bush introduced a blueprint for his education policy to Congress. Having Presidents dedicated to education, especially to the standard-testing based reform, Congress was more than familiar with the issue. Instead of wasting his time on persuading the far-

right Republicans who still opposed to the ED's existence, President George W. Bush chose to work with what he had. He even gave up on supporting private schools as it would face Democrat opposition.

The opposition coalition at this time was weak, since all major political actors, including the President, both parties in Congress, and even the Supreme Court ruling were being favorable to the other side. Thus, it gave up on resisting the standard-based tests. Instead, it focused on narrowing down the scope. Knowing that Republicans still favor block grants over categorical grants, interest groups lobbied the Capital Hill to include more block grants to the bill. Although private school support seemed to be difficult, interest groups and Republicans focused on attaching voucher and school choice to the bill.

Also, any movement to the nationalized evaluation was fiercely opposed. Even though Republicans adjusted their stance, national evaluation was too much; its constitutionality was dubious even to some Democrats. Moreover, ferocious opposition from educators to closing the underperforming schools forced them to be modified to softer language.

## 5) Policy decision

Due to the President Bush's swift introduction and determination, the No Child Left Behind Act was passed in the House on May 23, 2001 by 384 to 45 votes. The Senate passed the bill in June 14 with 91 to 8 votes.



## 6) Policy impact

Thus, the No Child Left Behind Act allowed the most dramatic budget increase on education in the nation's history. The budget for elementary and secondary education jumped in the following years. New programs were developed by federal government, and new organizations were made to monitor them. As a result, schools were directly affected by the movement. They had to follow federal regulation, and teachers hated it as their instructional time had to be devoted to the test preparation. Interestingly, as Democrats took up Congress in 2007, they cut federal spending on education to almost the same level it was before. The 2008 financial crisis caused even more trouble to increase education spending. However, the annual standard testing is still taking place in the classroom, and the discussion for accountability does not seem to get mitigated soon.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

### 1. Summary

In 1976, Kaufman threw a question in his book: “are organizations immortal?” Based upon the case study on the Department of Education, the answer is likely to be “yes.” Creation of an organization takes a long time and many controversies, but once it is created, it survives. Also, federal involvement is increasing in America. The question of *whether* there should be federal involvement changed into *how much*, and the answer is getting more comprehensive as time goes on.

Examining the history of Department of Education (ED), policy directions in four time periods directed its role and scope. At first, the events from 1970 to 1980 led to creation of ED. Because of the collaborative efforts of President Carter and NEA, ED was established despite fierce opposition from other executive departments, bureaucrats, education interest groups such as American Federation of Teachers, and even the executive office staffs. Although economy was worsening and public attention level to education was low, determination of the President and organized interest group support created ED.

A year after it was created, ED faced challenges from the newly elected President Reagan and his conservative supporters. It received little resources for budget and personnel, but it used its networks and status to survive. The internal organizations of ED were focused on management

functions, showing that it sought to build strong internal structure. Also, public relations and law compliance functions were emphasized to acquire legitimacy. Congressional lobbying also increased as the number of public laws during this period suggests. Since ED lacked resources, it depended on law to enforce its agenda. The most impressive legacy of the period is *A Nation at Risk*, a report that Secretary Bell prepared. After it was published, American public realized the seriousness of education for the country. Without investing much money and resources, the strategy of ED to utilize its status to influence public and media saved it from the verge of near extinction.

The third policy punctuation occurred as President G.H. Bush, the self-claimed “education President” took the office. Shocked by ED’s *A Nation at Risk* and other reports, Bush sought to bring an education reform that focused on standard-based testing and evaluation. However, the Gulf War took public’s attention from education, and economy was not favorable to increasing federal spending. Moreover, Democrats taking charge of Congress were not supportive of the President. Consequently, G.H. Bush’s reform attempted failed, but his successor Clinton took advantage of the Democrat Congress he had for the first two years to pass Bush’s reform ideas. Although educators, Republicans, and special interest groups opposed the movement, Clinton was successful since Business Coalition for Education Reform got his back to support necessary resources. Thus, Clinton administration amplified administrative resources at ED.

The latest change in education policy occurred after 1996. Republicans, realizing the need to support federal involvement in education,

shifted its side from anti-federal involvement coalition to pro-federal involvement coalition. Economy was too good to insist that ED should be abolished to increase efficiency; public concern was getting higher. Thus, only educators and state administrators were left in the opposition coalition, lacking resources to reach the Capitol Hill directly. Therefore, in 2001, the biggest federal involvement in education in history was brought by the No Child Left Behind Act. It increased ED's budget by 250%. New organizations for federal policy programs were created, and to monitor the policy implementation, ED's internal management function grew.

## **2. Policy Implication**

Looking through the advocacy coalition model, the process of the four critical junctures in American federal education policy demonstrates the following characteristics.

First, there were contesting advocacy coalitions that favored or opposed enlarging federal involvement in education, but the coalitions did not last long. The participants come and go depending on the contextual changes and their perception of the problems, so the number of each side's participants made it predictable which side was going to win. Department of Education and Democratic Party had long belonged to the pro-federal involvement coalition while Republican Party stood on the other side until the phase four. The pro-federal involvement coalition gathered attracted

more influence as time went on, obviously leading the mood toward its favor.

Second, throughout all time phases, the role of President as an agenda setter was highlighted. It is not a coincidence that the divisions of time phase for the four critical junctures are consistent with each Presidential term. Receiving the single most public attention, Presidents have an advantage of intruding the issue into the public's minds. Often times, what he emphasized on his campaign platforms and in the State of Union Addresses were realized. Also, he possessed the most resources and networks. Since the administrative agencies are under his discretion, President could exercise huge influence on ED's direction. Still, it does not guarantee that the side with the President always wins. Reagan failed to roll back ED, and Congress turned down G.H. Bush's *America 2000* education reform. It seems that the Republican Presidents and Democratic Congress do not work well in the field of education.

Third, the role of Congress was proven to be the most crucial in deciding actual policy. Although the President has the most influence, Congress does not always follow his side. Facing election every two years in the House and four years in the Senate, Congressmen listened to the constituents and interest groups more than the President when their opinions differ. Any new policy that shifts the existing policy direction was first resisted; only those that have been discussed internally for more than five to ten years were successfully passed. Compromise and bargaining in Congress often resulted in an entirely different policy from its first draft. It shows that America is a pluralistic country where the clash of factions with

different interests, as James Madison said in the Federalist Papers, prevent anyone's interest to dominate.

Fourth, Department of Education survived through its persistent effort to increase. Although it seems that politicians decided the education policy on surface, they were largely manipulated by the bureaucrats at ED. The single most important document in the history of American education is *A Nation at Risk* since it imbued the idea of standard tests. By putting new issue on agenda, ED saved itself from the Reagan's threat, and it was able to further expand in the following years. Besides timely publishing the reports on the right issue to be discussed, the ED staffs built networks with interest groups, politicians, and media so that education may get plenty of attention and resources.

### **3. Limitations**

The research depends its data on published sources. However, unpublished stories of the policy making process are often more significant.

Since it covers 40 years of history, the study focused only on major changes that happened during the time period. As a result, its discussion in education policy change deals mostly with elementary and second

dary education, which got the most attention. An in-depth future studies on each time period and the policy changes in higher education through the advocacy coalition model would enrich the discussion.

Since President Obama took office in 2009, how he changed federal education policy and ED was not explained in this paper. Although it shows a sudden drop in ED's administrative resource, future studies on how the 2008 financial crisis affected the size of ED are needed to conclude whether the trend is temporal.

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Abstract

# Changes in American Education Policy and the Department of Education: the ACF Approach

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The size and role of the United States federal government has constantly increased. In consequence, federal involvement in education policy, which was traditionally handled by the state and local governments, is also enlarging. This study applies the new institutionalism and the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to examine historical evolution of the U.S federal education policy and the factors attributes to its change.

According to the empirical data analysis, it was confirmed that the U.S education policy in regards to the Department of Education (ED) went through four critical junctures: period of establishment (1970-1980), struggle (1981-1988), stabilization (1989-1995), and expansion (1996-2010).

From 1970 to 1980, when the establishment of ED was discussed, American economy was unfavorable due to the Oil Shock. Public had little interest in federal education policy. Moreover, oppositions from administrative agencies, bureaucrats, interest groups, and Congress were strong barriers to the ED's creation. However, President Carter and National Education Association were so determined that their efforts to bargain and compromise resulted in the creation of federal Department of Education.

In 1981, as President Reagan took over the office, ED faced challenges. Reagan's announcement to abolish ED reduced its personnel and budget. In order to survive, ED utilized its organizational status and networks. Internally, public relations functions were increased to build legitimacy; efforts to lobby Congress and bureaucrats in other agencies increased; and A Nation at Risk report that the Secretary of Education published grabbed public attention. As national attention on education was escalating, Reagan and conservative coalition had to withdraw their commitment to reduce ED.

For the period of 1989 to 1995, ED was stabilized. American economy recovered, and public interest in education increased, and media frequently highlighted education issue. Furthermore, President George H. Bush and President Clinton pushed similar goals in education policy. Despite the opposition from educators and conservatives, strong will of the Presidents and corporate supports augmented the ED's administrative resources.

After 1996, ED expanded dramatically. As public attention to education was heightened, anti-federal involvement coalition was being dismantled. Republican Party's position change to pro-federal involvement coalition was a key to pass the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) swiftly

after President George W. Bush's inauguration. The NCLB escalated ED's budget by 250%, and the number of internal organizations increased to implement and monitor new programs.

Policy implications of the analysis results are as follow. First, administrative agencies are self-perpetuating. Even though political decisions downsize or abolish it, the administrative agency sought to survive through its status, media, and networks to institute new policy agenda.

Second, the President plays a key role in policy agenda setting. However, it does not mean his agenda is always going to turn into a policy. The advocacy coalition that the President belongs to has an advantage in policy-making only when it successfully bargains and compromises with the opposition coalition.

Third, the single most important player in policy-making is Congress. American Congress is a locus of political bargain and compromise. Due to the check and balance between competing advocacy coalitions, Congress prefers to promote policies that were internally debated for long enough time to be settled.

Fourth, the advocacy coalitions are quick to change according to their interests. Since their goal is not to maintain the advocacy coalition but to place their interest on policy, the advocacy coalitions do not last long. Thus, unlike Sabatier's assumption, the advocacy coalition framework is more applicable to three to five years short-term policy analysis.

Keywords: ACF, U.S Department of Education, historical new institutionalism, administrative agency, education policy

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